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JOHN ROCKER AND EMPLOYEE
DISCIPLINE FOR SPEECH*
LEWIS KURLANTZICCK
John Rocker's statements in a Sports Illustrated interview, Commis-
sioner of Baseball Bud Selig's suspension and fine of the Atlanta Braves'
pitcher for those comments, and the arbitral disposition of Rocker's
grievance in the wake of that discipline raise vexing issues about the
reach of the Commissioner's disciplinary authority. More generally, the
case also points to the little-noticed but significant question of how
Rocker would have fared under various state statutes designed to limit
private employer interference with employee speech interests.
In a December 27, 1999 Sports Illustrated article, Rocker offered
opinions belittling New York City, welfare mothers, homosexuals, for-
eigners, and other minority groups.' He also called an overweight black
teammate "a fat monkey." After speaking with Rocker, Commissioner
Selig, citing "the best interests of baseball," condemned the pitcher's be-
havior, noting that Rocker had dishonored the Braves and Major
League Baseball, and imposed the sanction of a seventy-three day sus-
pension, including all of spring training, and a $ 20,000.00 fine.2 (Selig
also ordered the player to undergo sensitivity training.) Rocker, through
his union representatives, objected to the imposition and severity of this
punishment, and the Major League Baseball Players Association
(MLBPA) immediately filed a grievance, claiming that the discipline was
"without just cause."3
The Commissioner's authority is significantly circumscribed by the
just cause provision of the collective bargaining agreement with the play-
ers' union.4 Accordingly, an aggrieved player, such as Rocker, can have
an independent arbitrator ultimately determine "whether there has been
* This article is also appearing in 16 LABOR LAWYER 3 (forthcoming April 2001).
1. Jeff Pearlman, At Full Blast, Shooting Outrageously from the Lip, Braves Closer John
Rocker Bangs Away at His Favorite Targets: The Mets, their Fans, their City, and Just About
Everybody in It, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 27, 1999, at 60.
2. Ross Newman, Now, Baseball Has Spoken; Commissioner Suspends Rocker Until May
1 and Fines Him $20,000 for Racial and Ethnic Comments, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at D1.
3. Murray Chass, Baseball; Rocker Permitted to Attend Camp, to Selig's Dismay, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 2, 2000, at D1.
4. BAsic AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AMERICAN LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL
CLUBS AND THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS AND MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, art. XI (B), (E) (1997).
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just cause for the penalty imposed."5 And, indeed, the arbitrator who
reviewed Selig's discipline found that it was excessive and consequently
reduced the suspension to the first fourteen days of the regular season.'
He further concluded that, under the Major League Agreement, the
Commissioner is not empowered to levy a fine of more than $500 in this
disciplinary setting.7 (The arbitrator let stand the sensitivity training
requirement.)
The protection afforded by the just cause limitation, which is de-
signed to curb arbitrary employer action, is particularly consequential in
the setting of professional sports because the employment effect of a
Commissioner's ruling, due to its industry-wide character, is more
sweeping than an act of management discipline in a more conventional
industry. For example, imagine an experienced Travelers employee who
is well paid, but has limited competence outside insurance. Fortunately
for him, market forces tend to limit the potential for abusive treatment
by his employer, and they provide him with options if he is maltreated.
Employment opportunities at other insurance companies affect Trav-
elers' handling of the employee, and they offer comparable job possibili-
ties if Travelers dismisses him. This market constraint, though, does not
operate in professional sports because a Commissioner suspension
amounts to a ban on hiring by all employers in the industry.
The just cause assessment involves two related central questions.
First, what sort of behavior warrants discipline; i.e., is the conduct legiti-
mately a concern of the employer? Second, what form and level of sanc-
tion are apt; i.e., is the discipline excessive? Rocker's case presented
both issues.
In his comments, Rocker did not denigrate his employer. He did not
criticize the operations of the Braves or of the league. He did not dis-
parage his employer's product. Nor did he question the competence of
supervisory employees (e.g., umpires). Indeed, the only mention, by
Rocker, of a member of the baseball universe was a reference to a black
teammate as "a fat monkey," without specific identification of the indi-
vidual. In short, his conduct squarely presents the question of the limit
of Commissioner authority to regulate players' off-field behavior. That
regulation is problematic as it affects the personal liberty and privacy of
players, and, therefore, the answer to the question plainly demands great
caution.
5. Id. at art. XII (A) (1997).
6. Chass, supra note 3, at D1.
7. Id.
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The response that arbitrators have given to this difficult question is to
insist on a demonstrable connection between the conduct and harm to
the employer's business interests. It is in the identification of exactly
what behavior counts and the level of proof of harm required that arbi-
tral law implicitly, and critically, defines and values an employee's liberty
interest and weights it against management prerogatives.
The discipline situation probably easiest to justify is when the "mis-
conduct" away from the workplace bears on the employee's competence
or trustworthiness, casting doubt on his ability to continue to perform his
job adequately and thereby interfering with the employer's ability to op-
erate the business successfully. An example would be the discharge of a
plant guard who has been convicted of armed robbery or an employee
who regularly ingests drugs shortly before coming on duty. Another,
more precarious, grounding of discipline, and the one Rocker's case
highlights, disapproves of off-duty employee behavior, which tarnishes
the reputation of the company or its products.
This reputational defense is more plausible when an entertainment
product with high public visibility is involved;8 this image justification
was at the center of the Commissioner's brief for his action. Indeed, that
line of argument has elicited sympathy from arbitrators passing on chal-
lenges to Commissioner discipline for off-field drug activity.9 In addi-
tion, and if the Braves had been able to offer objective proof of serious
economic harm, such as cancellation of season tickets, no easy task, his
case would have been strengthened. Moreover, in recent years the Na-
tional Hockey League (NHL) has disciplined players for voicing racial
slurs, with suspensions ranging from one to three games;' 0 these in-
stances of verbal abuse occurred on ice, so the justification for league
action (e.g., the threat of game disruption), is easier to accept.
8. In this respect, compare the case of off-duty bigoted remarks by an assembly line
worker in a widget factory. The Uniform Player's Contract, § 7(b)(1), provides that a baseball
club may terminate a player if he "shall... fail, refuse, or neglect to conform his personal
conduct to the standards of good citizenship and good sportsmanship...."
9. For example, in 1983 four members of the Kansas City Royals - Vida Blue, Willie Wil-
son, Jerry Martin, and Willie Aikens - were arrested and convicted of cocaine possession.
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn suspended each player for one year. After a grievance hearing
before arbitrator Richard I. Bloch, the suspensions of Wilson, Martin, and, later, Aikens were
commuted. In a number of these cases, though, while the arbitrator accepted the premise that
player use of drugs is a matter of legitimate concern regarding "the best interests of baseball,"
he found the sanction imposed disproportionate to the offense and, accordingly, reduced it.
10. K.C. Johnson, When Words Collide: NHL Addresses Bigotry; Allegations of Racial
Slurs Prompt League Into Action, Cm. Tim., May 2, 1999, at C7.
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The arbitrator's validation of Selig's authority to act, but reduction of
the penalty imposed, was not surprising in light of the precedents. The
importance of spring training for a pitcher's career and the fact that the
suspension ordered was greater than that prescribed for some drug users
undoubtedly contributed to the judgment of excessiveness. The severity
of the penalty for comments in a magazine might have appeared particu-
larly out of line in an industry setting where employees are expected to
speak regularly with the press. While the substantial decrease in the
sanction was a major accomplishment for the union, it had grounds for
disappointment as well as it had argued that just cause for any discipline
was lacking. Indeed, the decision can be viewed as precedent for the
proposition that Commissioner disciplinary authority extends beyond
drugs and on-field incidents.
Of course, recognition of the existence of Commissioner authority
does not necessarily mean its invocation in these circumstances was wise.
Indeed, Selig might well have been better served by a decision to con-
demn Rocker's venomous remarks, underline that Rocker spoke for
himself alone and not as a representative of Major League Baseball, ac-
knowledge the value of personal liberty though it may, on occasion, be
abused, and avoid the likely considerable future difficulties of fashioning
consistent disciplinary responses in other speech cases."
I. THE RELEVANCE (OR IRRELEVANCE) OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGlrTs
LAWs: DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT AND
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
Attorney Lewis Steel has suggested that Rocker's behavior impli-
cates federal civil rights legislation and that the discipline of the player
11. Important "extra-legal" sanctions in the clubhouse would still have operated. Follow-
ing the Sports Illustrated interview, Rocker was shunned by his teammates. In spring training
and early in the season, his teammates largely wanted nothing to do with him. It took almost
an entire season for him to shed his status as a pariah in the Braves' clubhouse.
Noteworthy, by contrast, was the treatment by NBA Commissioner David Stern of the
controversy surrounding an Alan Iverson gangsta rap recording featuring vile, misogynistic,
gay-bashing lyrics accompanied by the background sound of gunfire, a CD which produced a
stream of negative publicity. Stem termed the lyrics "coarse, offensive, antisocial and repug-
nant" and the recording "a disservice to [Iverson], the Philadelphia 76ers, his teammates and
perhaps all NBA players." However, citing his belief that the NBA should not be in the
business of regulating artistic expression, Stem determined not to discipline Iverson, imposing
neither fine nor suspension. A meeting between the Commissioner and the player, though,
did produce a promise by Iverson to edit out some of the most offensive lyrics from the final
version before the compact disc's release. Stephen A. Smith, After Meeting with David Stem,
Maybe Allen Iverson Situation Can Return to Normal, PHILA. INOUIRER, Oct. 15, 2000, at Al.
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was a legitimate response to the dictates of these laws.12 More particu-
larly, he contends that the Braves were obliged to discipline Rocker in
order to preclude team liability for employment discrimination on the
basis of race, i.e., the creation of a hostile working environment (Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act) and discrimination in the enjoyment of
the services and facilities of a place of public accommodation, i.e., dis-
crimination against potential customers on the basis of race or color (Ti-
tle II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). While Steel's suggestions are
distinctive, their validity is dubious at best.
It is true that federal law imposes liability on employers for the boor-
ish conduct of employees in the workplace that has made life miserable
for other employees. More precisely, an employer is responsible for
workplace harassment by co-workers if the employer knew, or should
have known, of the harassment and failed to take corrective action.13 In
light of this threat of liability, employers are sensibly alert to move ag-
gressively to restrain and monitor employee conduct that might provide
the foundation for hostile environment claims by other employees.
However, even accepting that comments not fairly attributable to the
employer and uttered far from the workplace are material, under ac-
cepted judicial standards, a failure to impose stiff discipline on Rocker
would not have created a significant risk of liability for the Braves. The
bulk of Rocker's offensive comments in the Sports Illustrated interview
expressed severe distaste for non-English speaking foreigners. He made
only one remark about a fellow employee, referring to a black teammate
as a "fat monkey."
Yet to constitute a Title VII violation based on race, an employee
must face a workplace permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridi-
cule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condi-
tions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment as judged by a reasonable person. 14 Rocker's conduct,
however distasteful it may have been to teammates, hardly produced
such a harassing condition. In determining whether conduct is actiona-
ble, courts have generally looked to four factors: the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening
12. Lewis M. Steel, Where Rocker's Rights End, N.Y. Tims, Feb. 12, 2000, at A15. If
Steel is correct, then state civil rights laws may also have bearing.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994); Frank S. Ravitch, Hostile Work Environment and the Objec-
tive Reasonabless Conundrum; Deriving a Workable Framework from Tort Law for Addressing
Knowing Harassment of Hypersensitive Employees, 36 B.C. L. RPv. 257, 262-63 (1995); 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2000).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
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or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasona-
bly interferes vith an employee's work performance. 15 Rocker's behav-
ior was neither pervasive, nor severe, nor physically threatening. It can
not even be characterized as an episodic pattern of antipathy based on
race. And a conclusion that Rocker's conduct, assessed objectively, in-
timidated his teammates and interfered with their play is untenable.
Rocker's comments to a magazine writer simply do not approach the
extreme, persistent, and unwelcome forms of speech federal judges have
treated as subject to regulation.
Moreover, the Braves could have taken prompt and effective action -
and thereby legally protected itself - without imposing on Rocker the
kind of severe sanctions that Commissioner Selig did. Thus, for exam-
ple, they might have counseled Rocker about the sensitivity of the mat-
ter, admonished him that such conduct would not be tolerated, and
warned him of the disciplinary consequences of another such incident.
Admittedly, hostile workplace law is somewhat mushy. The relevant
factors are nonexhaustive and unweighted; "severe," "pervasive," and
"abusive" are imprecise terms. The contours of the violation are vague.
Also, it is the totality of circumstances that determines whether incidents
collectively amount to a harassing environment. 6 Accordingly, since the
employer's focus is on the cumulative behavior of all employees, it will
be inclined to restrain any comment that might advance a hostile envi-
ronment, even when the comment by itself does not generate the envi-
ronment. The resulting uncertainty and concern for the aggregate
picture might well lead a prudent employer, anxious to avoid litigation,
to act preventively and to "oversuppress" employee speech by restricting
any statement that might contribute to a hostile environment. Employ-
ers, after all, have no general interest in preserving employee speech in-
terests unrelated to efficiency.
Yet, even if we assume that rational, cautious employers will engage
in some degree of overregulation of employee speech, no need existed
for the Braves to severely discipline Rocker. The aggregation problem
was not present in the Rocker case and his behavior was not sufficiently
egregious to be either actionable or worrisome. I am not suggesting that
the Braves should not have responded in some fashion, but a failure to
seriously discipline him would not have grounded a credible claim of
15. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
16. Tam B. Tran, Title VII Hostile Work Environment: A Different Perspective, 9 J. CoN-
TEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 357, 363-64 (1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (2000); Perry v. Ethan Allen,
Inc., 115 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 1997).
[Vol. 11:185
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE FOR SPEECH
racial employment discrimination due to the creation of an objectively
hostile work environment.
Mr. Steel's Title II contention is similarly unpersuasive. First, it is
quite a stretch to read Rocker's comments as designed to drive black
(and other minority) customers from the Braves' stadium. Also, it is
clear that Rocker is speaking personally in the interview and not on be-
half of the Braves or Major League Baseball. So, it can hardly be said
that the Braves have denied, or intend to deny, the full and equal enjoy-
ment of its facilities because of racial discrimination. Moreover, and in
any case, the Braves, again, can respond effectively and protect the team
from liability without imposing severe discipline on Rocker. To counter
any potential perception of discrimination, the team could disavow
Rocker's insensitive remarks, make it clear that he is not speaking for it,
declare its own contrary values, and publicize that all patrons, no matter
their color, are sought and welcome at Turner Field and will be admitted
and served without differentiation.
Under the Civil Rights Act, an employer is not obliged to change the
beliefs of employees. The focus is on behavior. Thus, the Braves, like
any other employer, need not dismiss all Ku Klux Klan members. In-
deed, any other reading of the statute would swallow up the interest in
freedom of association.
II. STATE STATUTES
A weighty, and unexamined, issue is the treatment of Rocker's be-
havior under state legislation enacted to limit employer interference
with employee speech interests. A few states, for example, Massachu-
setts, afford a degree of such protection under their Civil Rights Acts.17
But the most explicit provision, one specifically addressed to the em-
ployer-employee relationship, exists in Connecticut. That law - rare in
the United States - shields employees from retaliatory action grounded
in the employee's exercise of enumerated constitutionally protected
rights, including freedom of speech. It states:
Any employer.., who subjects any employee to discipline or
discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights
guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the Constitution of the
state, provided such activity does not substantially or materially
interfere with the employee's bona fide job performance or the
working relationship between the employee and the employer,
17. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 11 (West 1996).
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shall be liable to such employee for damages caused by such disci-
pline or discharge, including punitive damages, and for reasona-
ble attorney's fees as part of the costs of any such action for
damages. 18
Could the Braves discipline Rocker without liability if this provision ap-
plied? A proper reading of the statute yields a negative answer.
Since any discipline would be on account of Rocker's exercise of his
free speech "right,"'19 the central interpretive issue is the meaning to be
given to the qualifications of the proviso. Did Rocker's activity substan-
tially or materially interfere with his job performance or his working re-
lationship with the team?
Does Rocker's colloquy interfere with his job performance? Clearly
not if that job is defined as being a relief pitcher. His ability to retire
opposing batters is not adversely affected by the views he expressed.
However, baseball players do commit themselves contractually to con-
form their personal conduct to standards of good citizenship and good
sportsmanship. And Rocker's job performance might be seen to include
a measure of respect for teammates in a small group, cooperative en-
deavor. But these constructions run into serious empirical and concep-
tual difficulties in Rocker's case. First, in his interview Rocker barely
mentions and does not criticize the Braves. Indeed, his only mention of
a member of the organization was a reference to a teammate as a "fat
monkey." As previously noted, his comments hardly qualify as "fighting
words," much less the creation of a hostile work environment. And,
there have been no disruptive responses by teammates to the article. In
addition, to recognize the vague references to good citizenship in the
Uniform Player's Contract as effective limits on employee protection
would be to gut the thrust of the statute, which is designed to prevent the
18. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (West 1999).
19. While there has been some judicial disagreement about whether the law reaches
workplace expression, there is no doubt that off-site speech such as Rocker's is within its
parameters. Moreover, while, in some cases, the factual issue of causation has proved trouble-
some for complaining employees, the causal link between Rocker's comments and his disci-
pline is patent. The Connecticut Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to protect only an
employee speaking as a citizen on matters of "public concern." Thus, it does not protect one
who speaks on a matter only of personal interest, such as the terms and conditions of his
employment and an employer is, therefore, free to discipline an employee for making com-
ments critical of the employer's practices or expressing grievances about the circumstances of
his employment. Rocker, in his interview, quite clearly was not speaking out in his capacity as
an employee to express grievances about his employment situation but rather, as a citizen, was
addressing a matter of public concern-i.e., his belief and the belief held by others that New
York City is home to large numbers of unsavory and repugnant groups of people.
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crude use of economic power to quash speech distasteful to the owner
but not deleterious to the company.
Similarly, it is difficult to see how Rocker's comments could substan-
tially interfere with his working relationship with his employer. Rocker
did not, after all, publicly criticize or demean the Braves or Major
League Baseball. Nor, quite clearly, are his remarks part of a private
personnel dispute with the employer. While he may have lost the re-
spect of his employer as a person, his working relationship with the
Braves as an athlete is unlikely to be affected by his comments. Finally,
while the rooting of discipline in reputational harm to the employer is
plausible, to accept hostility to views publicly expressed by an employee
as warrant for discipline is to subvert the basic purpose of the statute.20
III. PREEMPTION OF STATE LEGISLATION?
Though the Connecticut statute, if applicable, would protect Rocker,
its application to an employee covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment with a "just cause" provision raises a difficult preemption question.
20. The statute undoubtedly imposes a cost on the Braves, who are placed in a difficult
position. Indeed, most employers, including Connecticut employers, would likely be surprised
to learn of this restriction on their disciplinary authority, as the state has generally offered
little protection for speech by private employees in the United States. But the decision to
limit employer control over its workforce so that it is not exercised in a way so as to inhibit
speech on controversial issues is understandable. For the workplace, where people spend
much of their day, is an important locus of public discourse. Much employee speech is not
work-related but rather is devoted to conversation about public matters, sports, politics and
the issues of the day. (In fact, the uses of political speech by employees as evidence to support
an employment discrimination claim under federal or state law raises serious constitutional
questions under the first amendment.) Indeed, if recognition of the value of free speech rests
implicitly on an agreement that we will live in a society with people whose views we dislike,
why should working with them be a major problem? The Connecticut statute expresses disa-
greement with existing employment law which gives employers too much authority to control
employees' speech on every subject, not just on matters of race and sex.
Yet the statute might be better constructed if it took account of values strongly held and
expressed by the employer, central values which conflict with an employee's stated views. A
business's interest in expressive association may be undercut by the forced acceptance of an
employee who advocates or epitomizes a position inconsistent with that adopted and advo-
cated by the organization. For example, a law firm strongly and outspokenly committed to
equal opportunity encounters an employee who speaks publicly in favor of discrimination.
However, recognition of such an exception should require a specific, announced position by
the employer, and one which goes beyond its interest in maximizing profits. The Braves'
contractual call for "good citizenship" would be inadequate as a foundation for exclusion of
an employee. Rather, vindication of an interest in expressive association should require the
identification of a clear position to be advocated over time in an unequivocal way.
This exception bears some resemblance to the exemptions, rooted in part in a concern for
intimate association, in fair housing and fair employment laws for businesses with a small
number of employees and for small owner-occupied housing units.
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Is the state legislation preempted by federal labor law, in particular, by
section 301 of the Labor Relations Management Act (LRMA)?
A confident answer is not possible, as much is in doubt in the pre-
emption area. The preemption claim argues, in essence, that union and
employer have negotiated a collective bargaining agreement under the
aegis of the federal labor law regime. That agreement includes a "just
cause" provision, which addresses the limits of employer authority to
discipline on account of employee speech; and arbitration decisions in-
terpreting that phrase constitute the law of the shop. Accordingly, the
Connecticut statute must yield in service to the goal of a unified federal
body of labor-contract law. This argument surely has force [is tenable].
Yet, the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements about section
301 preemption2' indicate that even though the state court action and
the arbitration grievance would adjudicate the same facts, federal law
does not preempt if the state action, implementing the provision of mini-
mum substantive guarantees to individual workers, does not require in-
terpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.22 Under that test,
the Connecticut statute would seem to survive.
Of course, the answer to the preemption question is unlikely to be a
very consequential one in the Rocker setting. That is, the relevant evi-
dence and standards of decision would be similar under both the "just
cause" clause and the Connecticut statute.
21. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
22. Id. at 413.
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